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Of Hearsay and Its Analogues
Mirjan Damagka*
INTRODUCTION
A witness reproduces a previously made probative statement in court. A letter submitted to the court describes an individual's observation of facts to be proved. In both situations,
the means of proof-the witness and the letter--draw their
probative validity from an ulterior informational source. In
this sense they are derivative means of proof.1 That the use of
such informational sources is potentially dangerous to accurate
factfinding is an old insight, shared by a great variety of adjudicative systems, past and present, regardless of whether they
embraced an encompassing hearsay concept. The Anglo-American hearsay rule, often hailed as a unique flower from the common law garden, is only one of many reactions to this ancient
insight, a reaction animated by a heightened sensitivity to second-hand information. This reaction is thrown into sharp relief
when it is contrasted with the continental European response
to the problem of derivative information. This paper's task is
to contrast Anglo-American and European treatment of derivative means of proof and thus to contribute to selfunderstanding.
Part I examines several features of traditional continental
institutions that conditioned indigenous attitudes to derivative
information. At the time hearsay doctrines congealed in England, these features were conspicuously absent from the English machinery of justice. The two contrasting institutional
environments, when carefully examined, reveal several factors
that nourished and sustained adjudicative systems' traditional
attitudes to second-hand information. Part II describes the
treatment of derivative proof in Roman-canon law of evidence.
* Ford Foundation Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. I speak of "means of proof" to emphasize that my theme focuses on
sources of information rather than on information itself. It is concerned with
the reliability of certain messengers rather than with the relevancy (or probative force) of their messages. As the term "evidence" relates both to information and its sources, it may in some contexts inject a degree of confusion.
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This law beamed a radiance throughout Europe, and was gradually adopted-mutatis mutandis-by most continental jurisdictions. The rejection of this law in the late eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries heavily influenced continental evidentiary
thinking.
Part III searches for analogues to the Anglo-American
hearsay rule in the contemporary setting and discovers an embarrassment of riches. Since the collapse of the Roman-canon
system, continental jurisdictions no longer have a common approach to derivative evidence: even in criminal cases, where
the sensitivity to second-hand information is quite similar, the
range of reactions to derivative proof is now very broad. Nevertheless, Part III draws a few generalizations from the most frequent continental responses. These generalizations are
especially poignant if scholars observe the continental panorama from the distant Anglo-American perspective: habits of
thought acquired by the rejection of Roman-canon proof and
the perduring similarity of procedural institutions still exert a
degree of unifying influence. Discussion in this part is quite
general; no more than surveyor's contours are offered of a lush
and varied legal landscape.
To compensate for this generality and to supply details for
a sharper contrast with hearsay doctrines, Part IV focuses on
the law of a single continental jurisdiction. Germany serves as
an example of the continental approach. In German jurisprudence, problems of derivative proof were subjected to most penetrating analysis, and the fruits of this analysis were widely
disseminated in Europe and beyond. Finally, the Conclusion
reexamines institutional pressures that generated the AngloAmerican law's comparatively strong distaste for hearsay. Most
of these pressures have lost their force in our time. As a result,
traditional attitudes regarding hearsay are shifting: old doctrines are increasingly challenged and proponents of the hearsay doctrine seek new justifications for strictures against the
use of derivative information. The paper closes with a few remarks on the resulting efforts to reform the law of hearsay.

A.

I. PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENT
UNITARY vERsus BIFURCATED TRIAL COURT

Because continental factfinders are mostly professional career judges, little danger exists that laymen will over-value the
probative force of derivative information. Those who maintain
that the Anglo-American hearsay rule is the product of jury
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distrust might thus be tempted to think that there are no compelling reasons for strictures against derivative proof on the
Continent. Yet, as soon as the Church of Rome fashioned the
traditional continental machinery of justice, restrictions on the
use of second-hand information appeared. They can still be
found-in one form or another-in most continental jurisdictions. Consequently, whatever role distrust of lay adjudicators
may have played in the genesis of the Anglo-American hearsay
rule, the origin of its continental analogues cannot be traced to
fears that amateur factfinders might be mislead by second-hand
knowledge.
Another feature of the continental court, however, a feature independent of the factfinders' attributes, significantly influenced the native treatment of derivative proof. Even when
lay persons sit on continental trial courts, which happens more
often in criminal than in civil cases, there is very little division
of responsibility between amateur and professional decision
makers. Unlike Anglo-American adjudicative procedure,
where the judge decides some issues outside the hearing of the
jury, continental lay judges are not isolated acoustically from
their professional colleagues: laypersons and professionals
jointly decide questions of facts and law. This "unitary" character of the adjudicative body makes the exclusion of derivative
proof less practicable than it is in the bifurcated Anglo-American court.
Admittedly, to the extent that inadmissible evidence is excluded before the trial, and trial judges remain ignorant of it,
there is no difference between the two institutional settings.
However, the derivative nature of information cannot always
be ascertained at the early stages of the process. Where the
need for screening information arises at the trial, the difference
between bifurcated and unitary decision making is highly significant. 2 In a unitary court, a judge cannot keep inadmissible
hearsay from the factfinder by a preliminary ruling; the same
persons decide the admissibility of evidence and the weight it
deserves. If the exclusionary option is exercised in this milieu,
factfinders must regularly be warned to ignore information
2. Continental lawyers often discuss the difficulty in their procedural
system of identifying hearsay before it has reached the factfinder. See H.A.
Hammelman, HearsayEvidence, A Comparison, 67 LAW Q. REV. 67, 77 (1951).
This difficulty is compounded by the standard continental technique of taking
testimony: only after a witness first presents a narrative account of what he or
she knows is the witness subject to questioning. The narrative account, of
course, may bristle with second-hand knowledge.
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that they would otherwise find highly persuasive. Inevitably,
exclusionary rules acquire a more pronounced aura of psychological unreality.3 Accordingly, if a continental jurisdiction
chooses to exclude second-hand information, it must be regularly prepared to require its adjudicators to reason in ways dis4
tinct from ordinary models of cognition.

B. EPISODIC VERSUS ONE-SHOT PROCEEDINGS
In Anglo-American law, during the period in which hearsay doctrines were formed, trials were not systematically prepared, and no mechanisms for appellate review existed.5 On
the Continent, on the other hand, the "decisive hearing" (trial)
was merely one stage in an ongoing sequence that included
thorough pre-trial preparation of evidentiary material as well
as regular post-trial review of factual findings. Even the "trial"
itself was not a continuous affair: it unfolded in phases during
which evidence was gradually assembled and examined. Continental adjudication is still characterized by this piecemeal style,
6
especially in civil cases.
The contrast between continuous and episodic proceedings
helps to explain the divergent continental and Anglo-American
reactions to derivative proof. The unhurried environment of
continental litigation illustrates the connection. If a witness reproduces an out-of-court statement in this environment, or if a
document contains such a statement, there is usually enough
time for the factfinder to seek out the original declarant for
3. Looming large in theory, this difference diminishes in practice. In a
variety of circumstances, Anglo-American jurors are also exposed to inadmissible hearsay and are required by judicial instruction to "unbite" the apple of
knowledge.
4. Obeying the law's demand that inadmissible information be expunged
from the mind may require factfinders to disregard their actual credal states.
A fragmented mental process is postulated in which zero weight is assigned to
a specified item of information. See Mirjan Damaika, Atomistic and Holistic
Evaluation of Evidence, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN MERRYMAN 91, 93 (David S. Clark ed., 1990).
5. On the criminal side, only a moderate degree of methodical preparation was injected by the justices of the peace. See John H. Langbein, Shaping
the Eighteenth.Century Criminal Trial, 50 U. CIE. L. REV. 1, 56-57, 115, 133
(1983). In the civil process, the preparatory stages (pleadings) were concerned
with the formation of issues rather than with the search for material to resolve them. Regular avenues of appeal were opened only at the turn of the
century, but with very limited opportunity for the appellant to attack the verdict for insufficiency of evidence.
6. For a portrayal of this "installment" style in civil cases, see RUDOLF B.
SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAw 434-41 (5th ed. 1988).
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production in court at the next phase in proceedings. If the declarant's testimony deviates from that of the hearsay witness,
the factfinder can hear them both in court and evaluate their
credibility.7 Even if the declarant is unavailable, there is sufficient time before the next stage of the lawsuit to collect information to gauge the trustworthiness of the out-of-court
declaration. In short, a relatively lenient approach to the use of
derivative proof is possible in episodic proceedings. This approach prevailed in continental administration of justice when
attitudes toward derivative proof were being shaped.
Several centuries later, the temporally compressed and
scantilly prepared English trial favored the formation of a different attitude to hearsay. If second-hand information were
freely admissible, the affected party would seldom have enough
time to track down and produce the original declarant in
court." Adjournments could provide this opportunity, of course,
but the practical difficulties of reconvening the jury militated
against the resulting interruptions of the trial. The "day-incourt" model of traditional common law justice was thus one of
the factors that made the exclusion of hearsay appear attractive
to eighteenth-century English judges.
Another factor was the absence of regular mechanisms for
reviewing factual findings. Since the quality of verdicts could
not be checked ex post, the English system was driven to exercise great caution in admitting "second-class" evidence-including various forms of derivative proof-at the trial. The context
in which the screening of evidence took place was also important for the treatment of derivative proof. Because judges
ruled on admissibility while proof-taking was in progress, they
were in no position to evaluate the reliability of second-hand
sources of information in the light of all other evidence in the
case. The probative value of hearsay was thus determined in
relative isolation from other evidence, as a small pebble in a
large, partially unknown mosaic.9 On the Continent, in con7. Because of the relatively informal continental style of adducing evidence, the hearsay witness and the declarant can even be confronted. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. See also LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF
JUSTICE 111, 142 (1977) (arguing for an alternative trial procedure which, in
addition to allowing defendants the opportunity to confront witnesses testifying against them, would also allow witnesses to confront each other).
8. Had continental justice been equally compressed, a similar problem
would have arisen: the judge (rather than a party) would have no time to locate the original declarant.
9. A good example of this "pointillistic" technique is the use of catch-all
hearsay exceptions under American Federal Rules of Evidence. Prior to hear-
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trast, comprehensive appellate review was embraced as early as
the twelfth century. It provided an opportunity for higher
judges to verify the propriety of verdicts, and reduced the importance of selectivity in choosing sources of information in
trial courts. As a result, continental factfinders were not required to use only "first-class" evidence. Moreover, in assessing
the validity of hearsay, they could check whether it was corroborated by other evidence.
In more recent times, the contrast between the continental
and the Anglo-American procedural styles has diffused: continental justice has abandoned the extremes of episodic style,
and Anglo-American trials are no longer "one-shot" affairs.
Mechanisms of mutual discovery and various pre-trial motions
now permit thorough trial preparation even in common law
procedures, and this preparation can include, of course, a search
for the original declarant. But while the "day-in-court" type of
trial no longer justifies the prima facie exclusion of hearsay, it
still has explanatory value. Habits of thought associated with
the temporally compressed model of trial have not completely
disappeared from Anglo-American jurisdictions. 10 The weakening of this model may also help to explain why contemporary
attitudes toward hearsay have relaxed to the point that the erosion of inherited doctrines is now possible.
C.

OFFICIAL vERsus PARTISAN EVIDENCE PROCESSING

Anglo-American and continental responses to derivative
proof are also influenced by the allocation of control over
factfinding activities. While parties are in charge of these activities in Anglo-American procedure, continental systems obligate the judge (or some other official) to take control of both
pre-trial evidence gathering and its development at trial." The
manifold implications of this contrast elude internal vision (the
eye cannot truly examine itself) because the familiar is taken
ing all the evidence in the case, the judge must determine whether a particular
hearsay item possesses sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be
admissible.
10. Thus, for example, judges are reluctant to adjourn if surprise occurs at
the trial and a party wants to investigate a matter.

11. It is worth noting that this variance is analytically and historically independent from the factfinder's profile; sometimes professional judges decide
(where proof-taking is controlled by the litigants), and sometimes lay adjudicators decide (where proof-taking is in the hands of a career judge). The former
is exemplified by the Anglo-American bench trial and the latter by the postrevolutionary French Cour d'assises.
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for granted. When scholars observe domestic arrangements
from an external perspective, however, these implications come
clearly into view.
In the Anglo-American factfinding process, each party
seeks its own evidentiary material, sifts it, prepares it, and uses
it in a manner that best advances its tactical interests. This arrangement creates a characteristic bipolar tension field in
which there is little undistributed middle. Witnesses are readily associated with one of the litigants, especially if they are
tutored by one party's counsel. 12 Means of proof are not seen
as "neutral" sources of information, "detached" from the
party's interests. The sense that evidence somehow "belongs"
to one of the litigants is stronger than in those systems where
party's counsel are less involved with the development of
evidence.
In this "bipolar" procedural environment the concern with
distortion or even fabrication of testimony, which is present in
any administration of justice, is greatly exacerbated. As a result, our system recognizes that it is a matter of paramount importance that each party have an opportunity vigorously to
challenge proof presented by the other side. Evidence that cannot vigorously be tested by the adversary is flawed,
and is likely
13
to be found inappropriate for courtroom use.
How does all this contribute to the malaise about derivative
proof? Consider first how difficult it is for a party effectively to
test a hearsay witness who is associated with the adversary. A
witness who lies about an extrajudicial statement can simply
insist, when challenged, that his or her hearing is good. If the
witness lies about a visual event, however, the lie must be woven into the fabric of a coherent story, making the exposure of
falsehood more likely.14 More important, the out-of-court declarant, whose utterance the hearsay witness reproduces, es12. Even in England, where "coaching" is disapproved, direct examination
is rarely conducted without prior interviews of witnesses by the solicitor. See
CROSS ON EVIDENCE 248 (6th ed. 1985). In America, where the preparation of
witnesses is more acceptable, it has often been noted how readily witnesses
identify with the party calling them to the stand. See, e.g., WEINREB, supra
note 7, at 99; Blair Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary PretrialProcedures
and Testimonial Evidence, 39 J. PERSONALY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980).
13. The problem of what to do with direct testimony if the witness becomes unavailable for cross-examination, or refuses to be cross-examined, is
quite distinctively Anglo-American. See CHAR-LES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMCK ON EViDENCE § 19, at 48-49 (3d ed. 1984).
14. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBuRG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 353-54 (2d ed. 1982). Admittedly, the same problem ex-
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capes cross-examination. The party opposing the evidence can
thus plausibly depict the out-of-court declarant as an ally of his
or her adversary, an ally that cannot be impeached. As reliance
on enemies who hide behind other people can easily tip the balance of advantages in an adversarial contest, the reluctance to
use hearsay in an adversarial system is closely associated with
considerations of fairness.1 5
Another source of heightened sensibility to hearsay in adversarial proceedings, however, is resolutely epistemic. As the
litigants decide what evidence will be presented in court, the
party's selection of means of proof is governed by the desire to
win. Eager to advance their cause, the parties (or their lawyers) may be driven to use derivative evidence even where epistemically superior original information is readily available. (A
hearsay witness may sometimes be more likely to impress the
factfinder than the original declarant). Independent of fairness
considerations, then, strictures against derivative sources become a means by which the court can pressure litigants to employ the epistemically optimal means of proof.1 6 To be sure,
officials in charge of non-adversarial factfinding may also be
tempted, albeit for different reasons, to use derivative evidence
in lieu of original proof. Such officials are less likely, however,
to require incentives for the proper selection of informational
sources than are parties fueled by partisan self-interest.
In continental procedure the pre-trial collection of evidence is the responsibility of the judge or some other official.
Lawyers conduct few factual investigations on their own; the
system disfavors contacts between attorneys and prospective
witnesses.1 7 If revealed, these contacts tend to decrease the
credibility of the resulting testimony.' 8 "Coaching" of witnesses is dangerously close to "tampering" with evidence. The
parties, or their lawyers, nominate witnesses and suggest other
means of proof, but when the court "accepts" these means of
ists in less adversarial procedures as well, but witnesses in these settings are

less readily identified with the litigants.
15. It is no wonder that where arguments of fairness do not apply, secondhand information may be admissible even if its reliability does not exceed that
of inadmissible hearsay. Admissions of the party opponent are a telling example in point.
16. This is the leitnwtif of Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle,73
IOWA L. REv.227 (1988).
17. In some countries contacts with prospective witnesses are a breach of
legal ethics. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423 & n.19.
18. See Hein K6tz, Civil Litigation and the PublicInterest, 1 CIV. JUST. Q.
237, 241 (1982).
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proof, they are not assigned to one side or the other. Rather,
the evidence becomes the court's information, to be tapped in a
non-partisan fashion. Under the prevailing continental trial
practice, the presiding judge first invites witnesses to present a
narrative account, and then questions them extensively from
the bench. Parties can address questions to witnesses only after
the judge's interrogation has been completed. 19 This interrogation technique (without direct examination by a party) decreases the need for lawyers to contact and interview witnesses
in advance of the trial. Because continental witnesses are not
assigned to one side or the other, the examination of evidence is
a single integrative enterprise without a formal order of proof.
Absent is the fission of evidence presentation into "two cases,"
each orchestrated by a party's lawyer. As a result, the court
can acquire information in the sequence most congenial to the
cognitive needs of its members. For example, witnesses offered
by different parties can be examined back-to-back, and if their
testimony conflicts they can be asked informally to confront
one another.
It seems plain that under the arrangement just described
proof is less readily identified with the litigants than in a setting where parties themselves select the methods of proof. Because sources of information appear more "neutral," the
credibility of witnesses is not tested as aggressively on the Continent as in Anglo-American courtrooms. 20 The threat of onesided testimonial distortions seems less immediate, and the perceived need to subject all evidence to vigorous challenge is less
compelling. The continental system's treatment of derivative
proof is immediately affected by this difference. Since hearsay
witnesses are less readily associated with the litigants, the
party's inability to challenge them as effectively as eye-witnesses is not as serious a drawback as it is in an adversarial
framework. The party's inability to subject the original declarant to courtroom testing is also less troubling because the origi19. Sweden and Spain combine a variant of examination by the parties
with retention of narrative accounts by witnesses. Italy is the latest convert to
a variant of direct and cross-examination, but only for criminal cases. See
CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE arts. 496-98 (Italy 1988).
20. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1236 (1958). It is worth noting, however, that the paucity of vigorous testing at a particular hearing can be deceptive. Extensive pretrial proceedings and prior installments of the trial offer many opportunities
for both officials and litigants to check the reliability of information and challenge witnesses.
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nal declarant is not as likely to be seen as an "unreacheable
enemy" as he is in the partisan mis-en-scne.
Thus, continental attitudes to derivative proof were shaped
by the confluence of factors pertaining to the structure of the
tribunal, the episodic style of proceedings, and control over
factfinding. As a result of the synergetic operation of these factors, the weaknesses of derivative proof and the best hygiene
for combatting them are still seen on the Continent in a somewhat different light than in Anglo-American countries.
Qualms about the use of second-hand information are less pronounced. Also, the exclusionary option is a much less attractive
response to the problems of derivative proof than in common
law systems: the ease with which appellate courts can review
the quality of factfinding on the Continent renders the removal
of second-hand knowledge from the factfinder's data-base less
important, and the unitary nature of the continental court
makes this removal more difficult. Because the continental
court controls the selection of evidence, the prima facie rejection of derivative proof is less necessary than it is in the AngloAmerican setting where it serves as an inducement to parties to
use optimal sources of information.
II.

THE ROMAN-CANON APPROACH

A. THE FOUNDATIONS
In the twilight of the Middle Ages, several centuries before
English judges articulated the hearsay rule, strictures against
derivative proof appeared in Roman-canon administration of
justice. They were part of an elaborate evidentiary system, a
normative edifice created and reared by ingenuous legal scholarship.2 ' Among sources of cognition recognized by the scholarly architects of this system, the most important was the
judge's personal sensory perception of relevant facts. Since this
most desirable path to knowledge was seldom open, however,
the attention of the scholars focused on "intermediaries" who
were required to convey to the judge what they personally observed about the facts to be proved. If the intermediaries
merely related to the court observations of other people, they
21. Original work on the proof-system was largely completed as early as
the 13th century. The system was rich in temporal and regional variations, but
its most sophisticated form emerged in Italy during the Renaissance. In depicting this variant, I draw heavily on my study, Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy,
in STUDI IN ONORE DI VrrroRIo DENTI (Michele Taruffo ed., forthcoming

1992).
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were not "truly" witnesses.2 2 From their testimony, the judge
could acquire only an "indirect indication" of the truth as revealed by the senses. Rather than giving credence to the carriers of such "indirect indications" of veritas sensus, Romancanon authorities required the judge to seek the prime source
of the intermediary's information and obtain his or her statement under oath.S Thus, whatever the prevailing theories of
the time may have been on the ultimate sources of knowledge,
the intellectual underpinnings of the24 Roman-canon proof systems were decisively proto-empirical.
When a witness testified in court, Roman-canon scholars
argued, the oath and the "awe-inspiring" presence of the judge
increased the testimony's reliability.2 5 A judge, upon observing
a witness's blushing and similar indications of falsity, could con26
front the witness with others offering conflicting testimony.
These guarantees of testimonial accuracy disappeared, however,
if the judge relied on the "dead voice" of a writing or accepted a
witness's retelling of someone else's out-of-court utterances.
Roman-canon scholars believed that relying on such testimony
27
was analogous to trusting "a copy more than the original." In
22. See PROsPERO FARINACCI, TRACrATUS INTEGER DE TEsTIBus, titulus
VII, questio 69, no. 7 (Osnabrugi (Osnabriick), Johannus Georgius Schwinder
1678). The treatise of this famous Roman lawyer (1554-1618) remained a
crowded junction of reference to Roman-canon proof until it fell from grace.
23. Id at titulus VII, questio 69, no. 5 (relying on Baldus de Ubaldis (1320-

1400)).
24. The emphasis of Roman-canon scholars on reports of sensory perception should not be taken to mean that the founders of Roman-canon proof system did not recognize the value of reasoning or inference from observed data.
The view of Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357) was widely accepted: the
judge could attain the same degree of conviction (credulitas)either by sensual
perception or by argumentation. See W. Ullmann, Medieval Principlesof Evidence, 62 LAw Q. REV. 77, 86-87 (1946). Only in criminal cases, and then only
if the judge contemplated imposing the death penalty, did the opinion prevail
that conviction could not be predicated on circumstantial evidence. Even on
this issue there were dissenting voices. See, ag., 1 PROSPERO FARINACCI, CoNSIUIA, consilium 60 note k (Lugduni (Lyon), Horatius Cardon 1610) (endnote of
Famiano Centolini, early 17th century annotator of Farinacci); 2 id. at consilium 108, nos. 4, 89, 96, 103 (Roma, Alfonso Ciaconi 1615).
25. The "awe-inspiring" presence of the judge must be understood by reference to the right of judges in Renaissance Italy to employ various forms of
disciplinary punishments against recalcitrant and lying witnesses. See, e.g., 5
BALDUS DE UBALDIS, CONSTIA, consilium 492, no. 5 (Venetiis (Venice),
Domenico Nicolini 1580); 1 FARINACCI, supra note 24, at consilium 83, nos. 2-5.
26. See, e.g., BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO ON THE DIGEST, at D. 48.18.10,
no. 2 (Augustae Taurinorum (Turin), N. Beuilaqua 1573); BALDUS DE UBALDIS
ON THE DECRETALS, at X 2.20 (Augustae Taurinorum, N. Beuilaqua 1578).
27. See FARwnACCI, supra note 22, at titulus VII, questio 69, no. 85; 1 FARINACCI, supra note 24, at consilium 13, no. 21.
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thus describing the infirmities of derivative proof, Roman-canon scholars displayed awareness of most "hearsay dangers"
several centuries before they were articulated by English lawyers. The major difference between Anglo-American and Roman-canon understanding of these dangers concerns the source
of the distrust of derivative evidence. The absence of a properly administered oath was a much more serious defect to thirteenth-century canonists than to English judges of the
Enlightenment era.28 While Roman-canon lawyers stressed the

absence of "awe-inspiring" judicial examination as a defect, Anglo-American lawyers singled out the absence of cross-examination by the party opponent as a particularly distasteful factor.
B. Focus ON ORAL HEARSAY
A major conceptual difference between Roman-canon law
and the Anglo-American hearsay rule is that, unlike English
judges several centuries later, Roman-canon scholars failed to
develop a regulation extending from oral to written forms of
derivative proof.29 Although they realized that reliance on the
"dead voice" of writings could be dangerous, their explicit regulation of hearsay covered witnesses only. This feature of the
Roman-canon system can be explained by institutional pressures that militated against a unitary regulation of both forms
of derivative proof.
The first obstacle to a written hearsay rule was the towering importance that Roman-canon law attached to the official
case file. The hierarchical judicial apparatus pioneered by the
Church of Rome rested on this informational link to connect
officials participating in proceedings at its various levels. Even
at a single level, the episodic proceeding required written documentation to allow the judge to refresh his memory about what
had transpired earlier. Courts included in this file records of
the witness's testimony, and judges used these records regularly as proof. In considering whether this arrangement be28. Note, however, that for a while after the time English witnesses began
to be interrogated before the jury, oaths played a more important role in English justice than on the Continent. (All sworn testimony seems to have been
treated as of equal value, to be counted rather than weighed.) See 9 WILLIAM
S. HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196, 208 (1st ed. 1926). Such

"mechanical" treatment was anathema to Italian Renaissance lawyers.
29. Some other interesting differences between the two systems, such as
the apparent absence from Roman-canon law of concerns about implied assertions, or the rule against self-corroboration, are beyond the scope of the present essay.
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trays an insensivity to the problems created by reliance on
second-hand information, however, it is important to note that
the probative use of such records did not entail all the dangers
of derivative proof. The witness's testimony, as recorded by the
reporter, was always given in court and under oath. In relying
on the file, then, Roman-canon judges were in a roughly similar
situation to jurors exposed to written hearsay under the standard exception relating to prior testimony.30 In addition, several features of Italian Renaissance justice alleviated the
epistemic dangers of using the file for evidentiary purposes. In
criminal cases, for example, defendants confronted witnesses
who incriminated them, so that an opportunity for "testing"
these statements preceded entry into the record.3 1 In important proceedings the reporter was also required to record the
facial expression and other "body-language" of the witness to
provide the deciding court with a substitute for demeanor
32
evidence.
The other feature of Roman-canon justice that prevented
the treatment of hearsay witnesses from extending to writings
was the civil court's heavy dependence on public documents attesting the existence of sales, loans and similar transactions.
Not surprisingly, these solemnly drafted documents were generously sprinkled with hearsay. Yet the court's decision to use
such documents as proof should not be interpreted as a failure
of Roman-canon authorities to perceive the dangers inherent to
derivative evidence.33 In spite of these dangers, Roman-canon
law prodded parties to use public documents because they discouraged litigation over certain civil transactions (or, at least,
reduced evidentiary difficulties in the event of a dispute). Authorities thought that solemnities attendant to the drafting of
documents would alert participants to the importance of telling
30. Of course, while the common law hearsay exception is usually predi-

cated on the unavailability of the witness, Roman-canon judges used the record of prior testimony as a matter of course.
31. Testimony obtained without summoning the defendant for confrontation could not support the conviction. See IULIUS CLARUS, SENTENCIARUM
RECEPrARUM LIBER QUINTUs, questio 45, nos. 13-14 (Lugduni (Lyon), Bailly

1672).
32. See, e.g.,

BARTOLUS, supra note 26, at D. 22.5.3, no. 2. This requirement was later adopted in German lands and inspired the famous "Gebfirden

Protokoll."
33. Since these documents incorporated transactions, they were often
used for "non-hearsay" purposes, as is the case in America under the "verbal
acts" doctrine. See MCCORMICK, supra note 13, 249. This article discusses
situations where the document contained constatory rather than performative
("verbal acts") language.
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the truth, and the "dignity" of the notary who drafted them
was supposed to guarantee accurate recording of what the parties asserted.34 Assumptions behind these expectations were
not altogether different from those justifying many standard
common law exemptions from the ban on the use of written
hearsay.
Roman-canon reliance on documentation thus muted but
failed to suppress caution of the courts in using written derivative proof. More importantly, even explicit strictures against
such proof in Roman-canon law surfaced as soon as institutional pressures to use official documents dissipated. For example, courts subjected testimony contained in "private" writings,
such as letters, diaries or notes, to the same restrictions as testimony reproduced orally by a hearsay witness.m This was the
case not only where writers reproduced observations of consequential facts by third parties (that is, in a double hearsay situation), but also when they simply recorded their own
observations of these facts. Demonstrating their keen sense for
separating hearsay from non-hearsay uses of writings, Romancanon lawyers acknowledged many cases where the dangers of
derivative proof evaporated, or were significantly reduced,
thereby allowing unrestricted use of private documents. For
example, courts were free to use writings which themselves
embodied a crime, or contained the admission of a party or a
criminal defendant's confession.36 It is worth noting that these
provisions had their exact counterpart in the law of oral hearsay. Courts did not classify testimony about legal transactions
(American lawyers would say "verbal acts") as hearsay. Similarly, testimony about admissions by a party opponent or about
34. Abuses of notarial office were visited with harsh punishments. See
PROSPERo FARINACCI, VARIUM QUESTIONUM LIBER QUINTUs, DE FALSITATE ET
SIMULATIONE TrrULus, questiones 153-57 (Lugduni (Lyon), Horatius Cardon

1612).
35. For more extensive treatment of this problem, see Dama~ka, supra
note 21; see also JEAN PHILIPPE LtVY, LA HtRARCHIE DES PREUVES DANS LE
DRorr SAVANT DU MOYEN-AGE 78 (Annales de l'Universit6 de Lyon, 3d series
in Law, vol. 5, 1939) (in cases brought to collect on debts the receipts, books of
accounts, etc. were analysed the same as oral hearsay when written by a third
party, and as a confession when they originated from the debtor himself).
36. A colorful illustration is Farinacci's treatment of a note in which a
servant promised to continue a homosexual liaison with his master, a Rabelaisian priest. Normally, argues Farinacci, this "private" writing would fall
within the ambit of the maxim delictum non probaturper scripturam. As the
promise itself is criminal, however, the note containing it can be used as proof.
See 1 FARINACCI, supra note 24, at consilium 25.
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confessions of a criminal defendant were not hearsay.3 7 Roman-canon law also recognized what we now consider exceptions to the hearsay rule: even if private writings, or hearsay
witnesses, raised all the "hearsay dangers," courts often lifted
restrictions on their use when necessary. Some of these dispensations from the usual restrictions on the use of private writings were quite similar to "classical" common law exemptions
from the ban on written hearsay.38
In summary, while Roman-canon authorities explicitly referred to "hearsay" only in regard to oral testimony, they extended strictures against secondary informational sources to
many types of writings as well. Although a general approach to
derivative proof can thus be detected, submerged, in Roman-canon law, a terminology limiting "hearsay" to its oral form became habitual and survives on the Continent to the present
day.
C.

THE CHARACTER OF RESTRICTIONS

Because Roman-canon authorities included hearsay witnesses among those who could be "opposed," some characterize
the Roman-canon law's response to the weaknesses of derivative proof as a system of exclusionary rules, or rules of testimonial disqualification.3 9 In fact, however, when the law of proof
was in its formative period, deciding judges still personally interrogated witnesses and examined writings, and thus could
regularly identify second-hand information only after having
acquired it. Moreover, as judges also acted as investigators in
criminal cases, they were often requiredto interrogate hearsay
witnesses in order to identify the original declarant. Under
these circumstances it did not appear to make much sense for
Roman-canon authorities to create barriers to the admission of
secondary means of proof.40 It seemed more sensible to admit
37. See FARINACCI, supra note 22, at titulus VII, questio 69, nos. 155, 157.
38. For example, regularly kept books of merchants or craftsmen, and
various business receipts were fully competent evidence. LevY, supra note 35,
at 111.
39. See, e.g., Karl H. Kunert, Evidence Rules, 16 BuFF. L. Rrv. 122, 144-45
(1966) (the group of incompetent witnesses was very large and included hearsay witnesses).

40. This is not to say barriers could not have been erected similar to those
created by Roman-canon law to "oppose" the testimony of certain classes of
persons (e.g., infidels, vagrants, etc.). The law could have required that the
judge-prior to beginning interrogation on the merits-first establish the
source of a witness's knowledge and stop the interrogation if the information
was second-hand. Roman-canon authorities realized, however, the practical
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information conveyed by such means of proof, and spell out
conditions under which second-hand information-if sufficiently confirmed by other evidence-could justify factual findings.4 1 The complex Roman-canon law of hearsay thus took the
form of corroboration rules, richly embroidered by scholastic
"expansions," "limitations" and "sub-limitations." In other
words, the Roman-canon law responded to the weaknesses of
derivative proof by adopting rules of sufficiency rather than
rules of admissibility. 42
Scholars who developed this scheme had no intention of
creating a normative straight jacket for judges, turning them
into automatons. For example, although the testimony of a
hearsay witness was confirmed by additional evidence exactly
as specified by authority, the judge still had discretion to hold
that the proper support for the hearsay was missing.43 Romancanon law also recognized many exemptions to its restrictions
on the use of hearsay witnesses, usually conditioned on the unavailability of the original declarant. 44 Ultimately, then, successful corroboration of derivative proof depended on the
judge's subjective evaluation, rather than the mechanical application of objective criteria.
This is not to say, however, that the original Roman-canon
scheme was merely a collection of flexible guidelines which
never interfered with judicial discretion. Although without
positive bite, the regulations could produce a binding negative
effect; they could prevent judges from declaring proof of a factual proposition successful, no matter how strongly they belimitations of this arrangement; the derivative nature of testimony can often
be established only after the witness has spoken. It is significant in this con-

nection that Farinacci discussed hearsay witnesses in a section of his treatise
devoted to opposition against dicta (rather than the person) of witnesses. This
section discusses witnesses whose testimony is inconsistent or obscure, that is,
witnesses who clearly were permitted to testify. FARINACCI, supra note 22, at
titulus VII, questiones 65-68.
41. See, e.g., id at titulus VII, questio 69, nos. 45-46.
42. Early in the 18th century, English judges would sometimes adopt a
similar approach, admitting hearsay but "with diminished credit." See John H.
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CI. L. REv. 263, 302
(1978).
43. See, e.g., FARINACCI, supra note 22, at titulus VII, questio 69, no. 47.
44. See id& at titulus VII, questio 69, no. 69. This should not be interpreted
as indicating that the only rationale for the Roman-canon law of hearsay was
the desire to stimulate the judge to use the best available evidence. Romancanon strictures against hearsay often applied in situations where the judge
could not find the original declarant, so that second-hand information was the
best evidence available in the case.
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lieved it to be successful. In criminal matters, if the judge
contemplated imposing the death penalty, this negative effect
was quite dramatic. According to the prevailing view, the ban
on the use of hearsay in this situation was absolute, and information conveyed by derivative sources could never support the
finding of incriminating facts. 45 Roman-canon law also placed
demanding requirements on the background of both the hearsay witness and the out-of-court declarant: unless both were
people "beyond reproach," the court could not use their testimony-even if it was otherwise properly corroborated.46
D. THE DECLINE
As originally designed, the Roman-canon proof system was
quite flexible. The main source of law was malleable scholarly
opinion, and seemingly stringent rules were actually hedged
with numerous qualifications. 47 In the course of the seventeenth century, however, the system acquired somewhat
greater rigidity, especially outside of Italy. The judicial apparatus changed as the functions of investigators and adjudicators
became more sharply differentiated than they were before.
This change played an important role in the law's loss of pristine elasticity. 48 Adjudicators began regularly to render their
judgments on the basis of the "cold" file that incorporated the
products of the investigator's work. In many deciding courts,
the practice also evolved in which only one judge on the panel
studied the documents in the case, and reported findings to his
colleagues. The full court would then decide on the basis of
this report.4 9 In short, while scholars who shaped attitudes to
45. This rigid ban followed from the rule that a criminal could be condemned to death only upon the direct testimony of two eye-witnesses or following confession in court. See supra note 24.
46. See FARINAccI, supra note 22, at titulus VII, questio 69, nos. 85, 94.
47. Even as a theoretical matter, the system's founders voiced strong
skepticism that the value of evidence, especially when conflicting, can be expressed in hard and fast rules. As an example of how numerical rules of sufficiency were readily brushed aside in practice, see 4 BALDus, supra note 25, at
consilium 455, no. 3; 5 . at consilium 69, no. 2. Accordingly, it is a mistake to
believe that the Roman-canon system, especially in its early forms, attempted
to turn a judge into an automaton, mechanically applying rules. I have tried to
dispel this mistaken belief in my review of John Langbein's stimulating book
"Torture and the Law of Proof." Mirjan Damaika, The Death of Legal Torture, 87 YALE L.J. 860 (1978) (book review).
48. There were other reasons for the loss of flexibility. Prominent among
them was the move toward codifying the law of evidence.
49. See, e.g., ADiMAR EsMEm, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRMNAL
PROCEDURE 232 (John Simpson trans., 1913).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:425

derivative proof focused on "private" go-betweens, "official" intermediaries now regularly inserted themselves between the
sensory apparatus of the factfinders and the sources of evidence. Significantly, these official intermediaries conveyed to
the deciding court not only factual perceptions, but also their
opinion on various matters, including the probative force of
evidence.
This multiple filtering of experience weakened the judiciary's sensibility for the messy welter of life, a sensibility to
which stringent rules of proof are procrustean. In the calm of
their offices, removed from the drama of life, judges applied
corroboration rules in a more mechanical fashion. From their
hierarchical hauteur, they found it desirable that unruly oral
testimony be tamed by conversion into the documentary form
before being submitted to the deciding court. Yet, even in this
new, more bureaucratic environment, rules of evidence never
affirmatively compelled judges to declare the proof of a factual
proposition successful. ° Especially in criminal matters, the effect of the rules thus remained negative; in the absence of legally specified evidence, these rules sometimes prevented the
court from finding that proof of an incriminating fact was
successful.
E. THE FALL
When, in the late eighteenth century, the Roman-canon
proof system came under full scale attack, the most powerful
weapons in the critics' arsenal were political and process based
arguments. Especially damaging was the system's longstanding
association with coercive interrogations and judicial torture in
criminal matters. Adjudicators decided factual issues, critics ar50. The opinion that Roman-canon rules of proof positively mandated
conviction has little support in relevant texts and even less support in what is
known of court practice. A frequent source of confusion is that the Romancanon system prohibited judges-as opposed to Angevin jurors-from using
their "private knowledge" in deciding cases. See, e.g., M. JOUSSE, TRA1r DE LA
JUSTICE CRIMRINEL DE FRANCE, Tom II, Partie M, IAv. H, Titre 25, no. 147
(Paris, DeBure Pare 1771). In assessing information acquired in performing
official duties, however, the judge was not using private knowledge.
Consider how judges softened the rule that two eye-witnesses constitute
affirmative "full proof." The law required that both eye-witnesses be "above
all objection"; inquiry into whether this requirement was satisfied opened the
door to vast judicial discretion. For example, establishing that one eye-witness
was sibi varius (i.e., that the witness was self-contradictory) entitled the judge
to declare that "full proof" was not made. For a case in point, see 2 FARINACCI, supra note 24, at consilium 174, no. 4.
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gued, in the secrecy of investigative offices, at great costs to
human dignity, rather than in open court under controllable
conditions. What appeared particularly reprehensible was that
members of the discredited judiciary-investigating judges or
court rapporteurs-mediated witness testimony.51
For a variety of reasons, rules of sufficiency also came
under fire. Background generalizations on which they rested
were redolent with class, religious and other prejudices which
Enlightenment ideologues exposed and effectively castigated.
Epistemic considerations also tended to undermine the system.
The critics argued that the probative force of evidence is inextricably connected with myriad concrete circumstances and that
binding rules regulating the sufficiency of evidence cannot be
drafted without placing the ultimate decision's accuracy at risk.
Inspired by abstract theory, these rules cannot do justice to the
particularity of experience and inevitably involve over-generalizations.5 2 Also, critics came to accept the politically alluring
assumption, propagated especially by the encyclopedists, that
ordinary people possessed the capacity to estimate the probative value of evidence properly.53 This assumption formed the
51. Critics of the use of records of prior examinations did not solely press
"human rights" issues. They also claimed that official investigators tended to
smuggle their subjective viewpoints into the record as they organized and summarized testimony. See, e.g., CARL J.A. Mr'TEnmAiER, DIE MONDLiCHKErr,
DAS ANKLAGEPRINZIP, DIE OEFFENTUCHKEIT UND DAs GESCHWORENENGERICHT

295 (photo. reprint 1970) (Stuttgart und Tidbingen, J.O. Cotta'scher Berlag
1845). For modern confirmation of these insights, see FRIEDRICH ARNTZEN,
VERNEHMUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE: PSYCHOLOGIE DER ZEUGENVERNEHMUNG 32-35
(1978).
52. Jeremy Bentham influentially exposited this view. See 1 BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 39-50 (1827). Bentham stated:
To take the business [of judging the connection between evidence and
facts] out of the hands of instinct, to subject it to rules, is a task
which, if it lies within the reach of human faculties, must at any rate
be reserved, I think, for the improved powers of some maturer age.
Id. at 44. Bentham was not without influence on continental reformers. See
Antonio P. Schioppa, La giuria all' Assemblea Costituente francese, in THE
TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, at 75, 86-87 (Antonio
P. Schioppa ed., 1987) (influence of Bentham on revolutionary France). Carl
Mittermaier, the great German evidentiary scholar and one of the fathers of
the "immediacy principle," referred frequently to Bentham. See, e.g., CARL
J.A. MITTERMAJER, DIE LEHRE vOM BEWEISE IM DEUTSCHEN STRAFPROZESSE 76
passim (photo. reprint 1970) (Darmstadt, Johann Wilhelm Heyer's Verlagshandlung 1834).
53. See MASsIMO NOBIU, IL PRINCIPIO DEL LIBERO CONVINCIMENTO DEL GIUDICE 131 (1974). Commentators sometimes spoke of this capacity in romantic
terms, reminiscent of Pascal's thought that "reasons of the heart" exist about
which reason knows nothing.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:425

basis of the critics' demand to abolish all rules that regulate the
validity of proof. Although a new system of corroboration,
based on different background generalizations, could still have
been defended as a protection against judicial arbitrariness, Enlightenment critics dreamt of a future in which ordinary citizens could be trusted as judges without such legal safeguards.
As a result of all these attacks, opponents were ready to dump
the Roman-canon system of proof, now politically vulnerable
and epistemically suspect, on the dustheap of history. 54
III.

THE NEW CONTINENTAL RESPONSE

Shaped in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the new
continental response to the problem of derivative evidence was
greatly influenced by the criticism of the Roman-canon law of
proof. Consequently, the rejection of legally controlled proofs,
and the hostility to officials interposing their opinions and findings between the decision maker and the means of evidence,
were important determinants of the new response. Framers of
the system adapted new ideas, of course, to a judicial organization that retained a great deal from the Roman-canon prototype. 55 Although factfinding arrangements had begun to vary
significantly from country to country, a few general observations about the genesis of the new continental approach are
nevertheless possible, especially if the continental legal landscape is observed from the Anglo-American viewpoint.
In the post-revolutionary period, the architects of modern
law no longer accepted sufficiency rules as a response to the
problem of derivative proof on the grounds that these rules
clashed with the newly-adopted ideal of free evaluation of evidence.5 6 What alternative strategies were available to continen54.

Spearheaded by Enlightenment ideologues, these attacks distorted

both black-letter law and actual practices. Enlightenment propaganda thus
contributed to the patina of partially misleading cliches that now covers the
Roman-canon proof system, especially as depicted in Anglo-American writing.
55. The machinery of justice continued to be hierarchically organized and
dominated by the professional judiciary, especially in civil cases. The new system used the lay jury to adjudicate a limited class of crimes, but in a few continental countries only. Everywhere, factfinding continued to be organized to
proceed episodically, and following brief hesitation in revolutionary France,
examination of evidence continued to be regarded as primarily the responsibility of the court.
56. Yet these rules remained sporadically in force even in the second half
of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure,
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG

334 (Tzarist Russia 1857).

269c (Aus. 1853); SVOD ZAKONOV, Book 15, t. II,

1
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tal reformers?
A. ANTIPATHY TO CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION
Rules excluding hearsay could have appeared to reformers
as an acceptable solution because, as a theoretical matter, they
do not interfere with the factfinder's freedom in evaluating evidence.5 7 Viewed analytically, the rules only shrink the pool of
information available to factfinders, and do not compel them to
process admissible information in a designated way. At a
deeper level, however, rules that exclude hearsay create a tension with the premise that the probative force of evidence
eludes regulation by binding legal rules. If the evidence's validity is indeed so heavily dependent on context that regulators
cannot make adequate advance assessments of its reliability,
then all admissibility rules that express a negative ex ante
judgment about the value of second-hand information (that is,
all relevance based admissibility rules), are equally spurious.
Under some circumstances, hearsay could be more reliable than
direct oral testimony.58 It is no wonder, then, that reformers
accepted categorical exclusion of derivative proof only if it was
mandated, not by epistemic reasons, but by collateral concerns,
such as the desire to protect citizens against governmental
overreaching.5 9
One must consider yet another factor to explain the Continent's negative reaction to rules excluding derivative information. Reformers thought that even if these rules were
theoretically reconcilable with the ideal of free proof, they
could still offend that ideal in practice. The continental courts
remained unitary and actively involved in the examination of
evidence, so that routine exposure to inadmissible second-hand
information could not be prevented. In this environment, the
law-if it embraced admissibility rules-would have to develop
a remedy for this exposure. Letting other judges decide the
57. Whether continental reformers ever explicitly considered the exclusionary rule as an option is open to doubt. Although they often invoked the
example of English law of evidence in their discussions, especially after the
middle of the 19th century, exclusionary rules (Beweisverbote) became an object of serious study on the Continent only in the first decade of this century.
For an early continental view of the English proof system, see MrERMAnER,
supra note 52, at 82-83.
58. See A. von Kreis, Das Prinzip der Unmittelbarkeit im Beweisverfahren der deutschen Prozef3ordnung, 6 ZErTSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFREcHTwissENscHAFT 88, 105 (1886).

59. A case in point is the ban found in many continental criminal proceedings on the probative use of police records.
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case would have been too costly and time-consuming. The only
remaining practical measure would have been for the law to
mandate that judges "disregard" inadmissible information.
Hence, even if hearsay appeared highly convincing to the
judges, the law would still require that they not attribute any
weight to it. Thrown out the door, rules on the evaluation of
evidence would thus come back in through the window.
All rules excluding derivative proof were not, however,
equally anathema to continental reformers. They accepted
rules which prohibited the use of secondary sources if original
ones were readily available to the court. The reason for this
different attitude was that these rules did not express a categorical negative judgment about derivative proof, merely a preference for primary evidence over its secondary refractions. The
reformers permitted the courts always to consider derivative
proof in addition to original evidence, and even give credence
to "proxies" if it appeared warranted under the concrete circumstances of the case.
Because the reformed continental law accepted neither sufficiency rules nor most admissibility rules, some lawyers might
expect that the new continental approach would permit judges
to use derivative proof without restriction, and to freely determine its probative force. While most continental jurisdictions
did indeed adopt this position for the adjudication of civil
cases, 6° virtually all countries adopted new limitations on the
free use of second-hand information in criminal procedure.

B. THE PRINCIPLE OF IMMEDIACY IN THE NARRow SENSE
The genesis of the oldest and most prominent type of these
restrictions is traceable to the eighteenth century resentment
of the role of investigating judges and court rapporteurs of the
ancien r4gime. This resentment generated the requirement
that there be direct contact between decision makers and their
sources of information. The law demanded that evidence be
presented to the full court, and witnesses appear personally
60. In most continental systems of civil procedure, the court can delegate
factual investigations to one of its members, and rely for factfinding on that
member's report. See HEINRICH NAGEL, DiE GRUNDZOGE DES BEwEisRECHTs
IM EUROPAISCHEN ZIvILPRozEB 62-66 (1967). Moreover, some systems permit

witnesses to give written testimony. See, e.g., CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE arts.
200-202 (Fr.) (new French Code of Civil Procedure). Oral hearsay is everywhere admissible, but the civil judge can refuse to hear a witness whose information is clearly second hand. Yet, as we shall soon see, the civil judge
typically must justify reliance on derivative proof to superior judges.
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before the decision maker. In continental legal discourse these
restrictions appeared under the rubric of "the principle of immediacy." In its original form, however, this principle-sometimes called "immediacy in the formal sense"-is not opposed
to all mediation between the decision maker and evidentiary
sources.6 1 Narrowly conceived as a weapon against "official"

mediation, the principle does not apply to hearsay witnesses,
although they also "mediate" between the factfinder and original sources of information. While without effect on witnesses,
however, the principle of immediacy, adopted in many countries in statutory form, came to restrict the use of certain categories of evidence that Anglo-American lawyers would classify
as "written hearsay."
C.

THE PRINCIPLE OF IMMEDIACY IN THE BROAD SENSE
In the course of the nineteenth century, some continental
authorities began to interpret the principle of immediacy in a
much more encompassing sense. They construed "immediacy"
to require that courts use the means of proof in their "original"
form. As defined by these scholars, original meant means of
proof closest to the fact to be proved, or phrased differently,
those that draw their probative force from themselves rather
than from an ulterior source. 62 In contrast to the original variant, the new version of the principle of immediacy had the potential of reaching hearsay witnesses as "private" mediators
between the factfinder and primary sources of information.
Yet, even those authorities who argued for this broader interpretation of "immediacy" did not contemplate an absolute ban
on the use of derivative proof. Insisting that only original proof
be relied upon would practically constitute a surrender to the
blackmail of perfection. The broader version of the principle
thus expressed only a preference: evidentiary "surrogates," including hearsay witnesses, could legitimately be used whenever
original sources of information were unavailable.6 In this new
61.

For the origin of the term "immediacy in the formal sense," see

KLAUS GEPPERT, DER GRUNiDSATZ DER UNMITrELBARKErr IM DEUTSCHEN
STRAFVERFAHREN 125 (1979).

62. One of the most influential early expositors of this novel interpretation of the immediacy principle was the German lawyer August von Kreis. See
von Kreis, supra note 58, passim. The principle so understood is sometimes
termed "substantive immediacy."
63. Until quite recently, support for the broader principle of immediacy
came only from scholarly authority, with courts sporadically adopting only
some of the principle's demands. However, in 1988 an interesting change occurred; the main implications of the broader principle were incorporated in a
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garb, then, the principle of immediacy came to resemble the old
English "best evidence" rule. 64
D.

JUSTIFICATION CONSTRAINTS

The final type of restriction on the use of derivative proof
is linked to the requirement that continental judges specify
their factual findings and justify their reliance on particular informational sources in reasoned opinions. 65 Despite the fact
that evaluation of evidence was no longer regulated by binding
legal rules, modem continental justice refused to interpret this
freedom from rules as a license for subjective judgment. Experience supported the assumption that original carriers of information are usually the optimal sources of that information.
Therefore, a court's reliance on second-hand reports, though
permitted, called for a contextual explanation. This was especially the case where the court, having examined both original
and derivative information, decided to give greater weight to
the latter. Significantly, the judge's duty to provide a justification existed even if original sources were completely unavailable, a situation where judges could hardly be blamed for
bypassing first-hand information.
Superior courts reviewed the trial judge's justification and,
piece of legislation. The new Italian Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
hearsay testimony cannot be used unless the original declarant "has died, is
infirm, or cannot be located." CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE art. 195 (Italy
1988). Strangely, this legislative ban on oral hearsay (unprecedented on the
Continent) is, on its face, stricter than its common law inspiration. For example, the Italian Code provides no dispensation from the hearsay ban for admissions of criminal defendants. In what shape this bold legislative innovation
will survive immersion in the realities of the continental institutional environment remains to be seen.
64. It is quite possible that the shapers of the "immediacy principle" were
inspired by English evidentiary thought. As noted before, Carl Mittermaier,
one of the fathers of the principle, was familiar with English evidentiary treatises. For example, he read Starkie, a votary of the best evidence principle.
See MITER=mAiER, supra note 52, at 28. Because original evidence need not always be epistemically optimal, there are minor discrepancies between "best evidence" and "immediacy" principles. However, these discrepancies involve
complex technical issues beyond the scope of this essay.
65. For a while, post-revolutionary France was intoxicated with the idea
that, because they sprang from subjective factors (intime conviction, logique
du sentiment), verdicts could not be justified. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The idea still has some currency in France, and may reflect the
psychological realities of individual belief formation. However, it is now generally acknowledged in Europe that the absence of binding legal rules does not
imply that factfinding decisions need not be "rationally" justified. See infra
text accompanying note 68.

1992]

HEARSAY ANALOGUES

if they found it unpersuasive, reversed the judgment.66 Considering that the post-revolutionary apparatus of justice continued
strongly to espouse hierarchical values inherited from the Roman-canon process, it is no wonder that the demise of sufficiency rules generated the need for this particular mechanism
of superior control.6 7 In fact, it is so widespread in contemporary continental justice, in both civil and criminal cases, that it
can safely be regarded as the most common restriction on the
court's freedom to use derivative sources of information. This
restriction's effectiveness varies from country to country depending on institutional practices concerning the techniques of
writing opinions and the rigors of appellate review. The importance of the device can easily be exaggerated, but it should not
be dismissed as pro fora.
It is true that the reasons the trial
judge advances for reliance on derivative proof seldom, if ever,
reflect the actual decision-making process. Nevertheless, requiring the trial judge to provide plausible grounds for relying
on second-hand evidence, even if those grounds were not present in his or her mind at the time of the decision, discourages
68
judicial arbitrariness.
The operation of all these continental restrictions on the
free use of derivative evidence is illustrated by the German
criminal process.
IV.

THE GERMAN APPROACH

A. WRIrrEN HEARSAY
The first sentence of section 250 of the German Code of
Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1877 but still in force, broadly
proclaims: "If evidence of a fact rests upon a person's observation, this person must be examined at the trial. '6 9 Although
this passage can be understood as applying to a broad spectrum
of derivative means of proof, the prevailing opinion is that it applies only to writings, and is designed to reduce the evidentiary
66. The next section discusses a decision of the German Supreme Court as
an example of this superior review.

67. In the Roman-canon system, judges were seldom required to justify
their finding in an opinion; sufficiency rules were expected to guarantee deci-

sional rectitude, and appellate courts simply checked their observance by the
court below. Even so, some authorities admonished judges to give specific
grounds for finding particular testimony trustworthy. See BARToLus, supra
note 26, at D. 29.5.3, no. 1.
68. See MICHELE TARUFFO, LA MOTIVAZIONE DELLA SENTENZA civILE 107

(1975).
69. STRAFPROZE3ORDNUNG [StPO] § 250 (F.R.G.).
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role of written records. This narrow interpretation is supported by the next sentence of section 250, which prohibits the
court from substituting a written record of a witness's testimony for actual in-court interrogation. 70 The effect of the potentially far-reaching proclamation of the first sentence of
section 250 is thus limited to a class of official documents which
would be written hearsay in common law parlance. 71 In other
words, section 250 expresses only the narrow version of the immediacy principle, aimed at preventing "official" mediation between the decisionmaker and informational sources.
The continuing importance of pretrial dossiers, however,
renders even this limited ban subject to important qualifications.72 For example, the court may use the record of a prior
judicial examination when a witness is hindered from appearing at trial.73 Under somewhat more restrictive conditions, the
court can even admit records of police interrogations. 74 Only
the defendant's confession cannot be proved by reading police
files. This last restriction is a rare example of an unconditional
exclusionary rule in the continental context. It should be realized, however, that this rule is mandated as much by the desire
to protect citizens' rights as by the desire to assure the accuracy
75
of factfinding.
The Code also contains a provision which allows the court
to use both judicial and police files to confront testifying wit70. Id This interpretation is supported by legislative history. See GEPPERT, supra note 61, at 107, 109.
71. This survey of German law employs the Anglo-American terms "oral
hearsay" and "written hearsay." These terms are used even though German
lawyers, following usage established in Roman-canon law, restrict the term
"hearsay" to oral testimony alone.
72. STPO § 251 (F.R.G.).

73. I& § 251(1).
74. Id § 251(2). The use of police records is widespread in practice, especially in the case of traffic offenses, where police officers frequently are unable
to recall necessary details by the time of trial.
75. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, police
records containing a defendant's confession can worm their way into trial proceedings through darkly shadowed corners of the system. In Germany, as in
common law countries, police officers are permitted to testify about the defendant's confession. There is nothing to prevent them from using police
memoranda in preparing their testimony. Moreover, the presiding judge is familiar with the entire police file, including the suspect's confession, providing
another way for information from the police file to enter the decision maker's
chamber. Furthermore, the records of the defendant's pre-trial examination
by a judge can be read for the purpose of receiving evidence of a confession.
STPO § 254(1) (F.R.G).
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nesses with prior conflicting statements. 76 Although this provision is sometimes understood as designed solely to enable the
court to expose the witness's own inconsistencies, in practice
witnesses are often confronted with inconsistent statements
made by other persons as well. 77 The prevailing view is that
such statements can be used to determine, not only the ancillary fact of the witness's credibility, but also all other facts of
consequence.78 Phrased in common law terms, the prior conflicting statements can be employed both for impeachment and
substantive purposes.7 9 It is also important that the presiding
judge studies the dossier in advance of the trial; absent familiarity with documents contained in the dossier, he or she could
not effectively examine witnesses. Since it would be unrealistic
to deny that documents in the dossier leave at least some imprint upon the presiding judge's mind, this most important
member of the trial court is regularly exposed to written hearsay. In sum, the extent to which the principle enunciated in
section 250 of the Code prevents the use of records of prior official interrogations can be vastly exaggerated.8 0
Another type of written hearsay includes letters, diaries,
and similar documents. Continental systems generally recognize the derivative nature of information from these sources in
double-hearsay situations, that is, where the author of a writing
has conveyed the observations of another person.8 ' Where a
person has committed his or her own perceptions to writing,
however, the derivative character of evidence is not clear to
continental theorists, and "hearsay dangers" are seldom dis76. STPO § 253(2) (F.R.G.). Another permitted use of the dossier is to refresh the testimony of a witness. Ic § 253(1).
77. For a sharp academic attack on these practices, see the still influential
views expressed in 1 EBERHARD SCHMIDT, LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 192 (1952). Contra THEODOR KEINKNECHT & KARLHEINZ
MEYER, STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG 895 (38th ed. 1987).
78. See CLAUS ROxiN & EDUARD KERN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 202 (9th
ed. 1969). For a contrary opinion, see 2 SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 724 (1957).
See also MAX AiSBERG ET AL., DER BEWEISANTRAG IM STRAPROZESS 330 (5th

ed. 1983).
79. Note that the law's mandate that information be used for only a specified purpose conflicts with the post-revolutionary continental ideal that legal
rules should not interfere with the factfinder's processes of belief formation.
80. Contemporary common law systems also admit many types of official
documents under exceptions to the hearsay rule.
81. Although, as suggested, continental lawyers do not use the term
"hearsay" in this context, see supra note 71, parallels to hearsay witnesses are
readily drawn.
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cussed in this context.8 2 However, in Germany, in contrast
with other continental systems, these dangers seem to be regularly diagnosed even in regard to single hearsay.8 3 What remains controversial in Germany is whether such writings
should be used only if the person whose observations are reported is unavailable (or if other exceptional circumstances exist).8 4
Most German courts require the defendant's
unavailability only in situations where writings were made in
contemplation of litigational use.s5 As a result, memoranda,
letters and similar documents often escape exclusionary provisions that are routinely applied to official records of prior interrogations. However, there may be other obstacles in the path of
their probative use, such as the requirement that the judges
justify their reliance on such derivative sources of information.
The final picture that emerges of the treatment of written
hearsay in Germany is that this form of hearsay, with minor
exceptions, is freely admissible. In the Anglo-American doctrinal scheme, the situation is reversed; written hearsay is excluded in principle, but the principle is "islandized"' 8 by
exceptions. Consequently, in terms of the volume of actually
admissible second-hand information, the contrast between Germany's criminal procedure and our evidentiary system is not
nearly as overwhelming as is often thought.

B. ORAL HEARSAY
There are no explicit statutory provisions limiting the use
82.

It is thus often thought that concerns of immediacy (understood in the

broader sense) require only that the originals of memoranda and similar documents be used, and that "surrogates," especially oral reports of the writings'
content, be used only if the originals are unavailable. See, e.g., 2 VLADIMIR
BAYER, JUGOsLAvENSKo KRmCNo PROCESNO PRAVO 197, 218-19 (1978).
83. See, e.g., GEPPERT, supra note 61, at 173. Yet, even this author defines
hearsay as "transfer of somebody else's observations" (Weitergabe fremder

Tatsachenwahrnehmungen). I& at 36.
84. These circumstances include those discussed above in connection with
the use of official records of prior interrrogations. See supra notes 73-79 and
accompanying text.
85. This opinion finds support in the text of § 250, which prohibits not
only the reading of official records of prior examination, but also the reading
of "written statements" (schriftlicheErklffrung). STPO § 250 (F.R.G); see ALSBERG ET AL., supra note 78, at 462-63; cf.GEPPERT, supra note 61, at 201. The
German Supreme Court seems to have left the issue undecided. See Decision
of July 14, 1954, BGH 5th Strafsenat, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 206, 212 (F.R.G.).
86. "In the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a small
and lonely island." Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce of Hearsay,46 IowA L.
REv. 331, 346 (1961).
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of hearsay witnesses in Germany. However, in practice they
are usually called to testify only when primary witnesses are
unavailable, or to supplement primary witnesses' testimony.8 7
It is tempting to think that this practice reflects the German
courts' tacit acceptance of the principle of immediacy in its
broad sense, that is, as a general demand that original means of
proof be used whenever available. Most German courts, however, refuse to interpret "immediacy" in this. broad sense, and
those few German authorities that do embrace the broad version of "immediacy" do not hold that it explains the treatment
of hearsay witnesses. Their reasoning, however, is of dubious
validity.
Hearsay, their argument runs, is processed in two stages.
In the first, the factfinder seeks to ascertain whether the declarant really made an out-of-court statement. In the second,
the factfinder uses this finding as circumstantial evidence that
the statement is true. In other words, hearsay is used as a basis
for an indirect inference, rather than testimonially as a direct
assertion of a fact. On this view, then, the hearsay witness is
not a derivative source, but instead is a first-hand source of information concerning the evidentiary fact that the declarant
made a statement.88 This argument is unconvincing because
"circumstantial evidence" used by the factfinder in the second
processing stage includes judgments about the credibility of the
declarant. It is precisely the frailty of such judgments that lies
at the root of the ubiquitous preference for original means of
proof. If a justice system is not troubled by such judgments, it
is difficult to see why it espouses the principle of immediacy in
the first place.8 9
87. In this supplementary role, hearsay witnesses are frequently police officers called to clarify inconsistencies between a witness's statements to the
police and testimony in court. There is some authority for the proposition that
a hearsay witness's testimony can be used in lieu of direct oral testimony even
where the latter is readily available. See, e.g., AISBERG ET AL., supra note 78,
at 461.
88. The Austrian scholar Julius Glaser laid out the initiating path for this
reasoning. See JuLIus GLASER, BEITRAGE ZUR LEHRE VOM BEwEIs im STRAFPROZEB 263-64 (photo. reprint 1978) (Leipzig, Neudruck der Ausgabe 1883).

Probably the clearest statement of this position is still in 1 ScHmiDT, supra

note 77, at 196. Note that this view is shared by the German Supreme Court.
Judgment of Aug. 1, 1962, 3d Strafsenat, 17 BGHSt 382, 383 (F.R.G.).
89. Observe the Pickwickian use of the term "circumstantial evidence" in
the description of the second stage of the factfinder's reasoning. The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence normally relates to the content of information conveyed by an informational source. It addresses the
question whether information transmitted by the source concerns an ultimate
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Nevertheless, most German courts refuse to subscribe to
the principle of immediacy in its broad sense. It is therefore
puzzling why they tend to rely on hearsay witnesses only
where first-hand testimonial reports are unavailable, or in addition to direct oral testimony. The answer is provided by a further restriction on the use of hearsay adopted by the German
justice system.9° Like their continental confreres, German
judges control factfinding and-at least in criminal cases--are
responsible for the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the evidentiary material. Expressing this traditional orientation, the
German Code of Criminal Procedure requires the court to extend the reception of evidence to "all means of evidence which
are important for the decision." 91 It follows that a German
judge who examines a hearsay witness while refusing to call
the original declarant (if available) faces a difficult task in justifying this omission to the appellate court. To be sure, there are
no binding rules premised on the notion that original witnesses
are more trustworthy than those reporting hearsay. Yet, because evidence filtered by intermediaries contains sources of error absent from direct oral testimony, judges are required to
explain their decision to rely on hearsay. If the appellate court
is not satisfied with this explanation, the trial court's decision
will be reversed on the ground that the judge violated his or
her duty "to clarify the case." 92 It is no wonder that the typical
or an evidentiary fact. In contrast, the distinction between original and derivative means of proof concerns the "carriers" of information and is indifferent to
the content of information they convey. (Hearsay witnesses can testify to both
ultimate and evidentiary facts, and the same holds for primary witnesses).
The argument presented in the text thus conflates concepts pertaining to
messages with concepts concerning messengers.
The argument criticized in the text surfaces-in slightly changed form-in
Anglo-American legal theory as well. It is used, for example, to limit the
scope of the hearsay curse by admitting testimony containing inferences from
the "state of mind." See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 14, at 425 (critical
of "state of mind" admissions). The confusion of concepts relating to messages
and messengers is also not limited to continental theory. In the United States,
for example, the hearsay rule is often included among relevancy rules, even
though relevancy concerns the probative value of messages rather than the
credibility of messengers. While the judge normally rules on the relevancy of
information, the credibility of informational sources is usually assessed by the

jury.
90. This restriction is but a variant of the last type of mechanism mentioned in the preceding section in discussing the genesis of the modern continental approach to hearsay.
91. STPO § 244(2) (F.R.G.).
92. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 30, 1951, 1st Strafsenat, 1 BGHSt 373, 375;
17 BGHSt at 382.
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judge tries to avoid difficulties of justification, and tends to rely
on hearsay only when original means of proof are unavailable
93
or to complement direct oral testimony.
The threat of appeal gives trial judges an incentive to justify their reliance on hearsay testimony with care even where
original means of proof are unavailable. The interplay between
the trial court justification of this reliance on hearsay and appellate review can be glimpsed from a recent decision of the
German Supreme Court.94 In this case, the trial court convicted the defendant of sexually abusing his minor daughter.
The verdict rested (in part) on oral hearsay: three witnesses
reported what the daughter had told them about her sexual
contacts with the defendant. 95 The trial judge attempted to justify his decision to give credence to the hearsay witnesses by
pointing out that these witnesses-of whom one was a social
worker and another a teacher-had ample experience with
children, and were all firmly convinced that the girl had told
them the truth. In addition, the trial judge explained that, in
his opinion, the victim's description of the incidents was identical on three separate occasions, except for a few minor details
that were a source of embarrassment to the child.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial judge
erred in relying on hearsay witnesses without first establishing
the concrete circumstances (such as the victim's demeanor in
93. Deserving of note is the sporadically encountered opinion that the
subsidiary use of oral hearsay, far from contradicting free evaluation of evidence, may in some situations be mandated by it. A judge who relies on hearsay witnesses, it is urged, is sometimes completely at their mercy to determine
the credibility of the declarants. An illustration in point is the use of statements obtained by the police from unidentified informers. In this situation,
the court is deprived of most information required to adequately assess the declarant's trustworthiness. The assessment of credibility is thus transferred to
police officers. But, the argument concludes, free judicial evaluation is hostile
to this transfer, and assumes that the credibility of informational sources is established by the factfinder personally. See, e.g., Karl Peters, Individuagerech-

tigkeit und Allgemeininteresse im StrafJprozefi, in SuhMUM Ius, SUMMA

INIURIA 191 (Tiibinger Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen 1963).
94. Decision of Nov. 11, 1987, as reported in 1988 NEuE ZErrSCHRiFT FOR
STRAFRECHT No. 3, p. 144. It is instructive to compare this judgment with the
Eighth Circuit decisions collected by Eleanor Swift in her contribution to this

Symposium. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work-- Has It Been Abolished De Facto by JudicialDecision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 496 n.72 (1992).
95. At trial, the daughter successfully invoked her privilege, provided by

German law, to refrain from testifying against her father. STPO § 52(1)

(F.R.G.). Thus, the daughter's pretrial testimony could not be used at trial,

nor could officials who examined her in pretrial proceedings testify about her
prior testimony. See id. § 252.
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relating the story of her predicament) which led the hearsay
witnesses to believe the girl. Their experience with children,
no matter how significant, was too remote and general a ground
to support their credibility judgments. Nor was it enough for
the trial judge merely to refer to minor discrepancies in the victim's reports of the incidents, notwithstanding the fact that
they can be explained away as embarrassing to the child. He
should have specified the variance, so that higher courts could
establish whether it leaves the victim's credibility intact.
C.

SUMMARY

The final picture that appears from the German variation
of modern continental approaches to derivative proof is that the
rejection of the Roman-canon scheme, coupled with the refusal
to embrace a comprehensive exclusionary response to hearsay,
has not resulted in a system where the use of derivative information is left entirely in the discretion of the trial judge. Leaving aside statutory strictures against the use of records of
pretrial interrogations, the most common obstacle to the judge's
freedom is the requirement that he or she justify recourse to
epistemically suspect informational sources. The impact of this
requirement is that hearsay evidence is seldom used when better sources of information are easily accessible. Where both
original and derivative information are used to prove a proposition of fact, the justification requirement has the further practical effect of keeping cases where hearsay is accorded greater
weight than firsthand testimonial accounts to the minimum.
CONCLUSION
This historical and comparative survey provides several lessons for Anglo-American legal scholars. The survey clearly
shows that strictures against the use of derivative proof are by
no means unique to the common law culture; restriction on its
use existed on the Continent of Europe long before AngloAmerican law of evidence first made its appearance. Even today, although continental justice is conducive to the admission
of hearsay, courts recognize the weaknesses of derivative proof
and generate restrictions on its free use. The Anglo-American
wariness of hearsay, although not unique, acquired a special
poignancy in the environment of traditional procedural institutions. The characteristic prima facie exclusion of hearsay can
thus be explained, at least in part, by the pressure exerted by
these institutions.
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More recently, Anglo-American justice has changed. Most
pressures that gave birth to strictures against hearsay have
ceased to operate, or have been seriously weakened. In modern
jury trials, for example, the argument that the trier of fact
should be protected from hearsay no longer carries much
weight in light of complex instructions to the contemporary
jury on how to separate hearsay from non-hearsay uses of evidence. Even a sophisticated and detached professional judge
would be hard put to follow these instructions. More importantly, the insufficiently prepared, "one-shot," "day-in-court"
trial is no longer the norm: potent discovery mechanisms, pretrial motions and many other devices known to modern litigation, especially in civil cases, have alleviated difficulties that a
free admission of hearsay could create in the traditional procedural system.9 The support for inherited hearsay doctrines is
thus quickly fading in virtually all Anglo-American jurisdictions. Courts are lowering barriers against the admission of
hearsay virtually everywhere, and some critics even advocate a
system that freely admits derivative evidence. But here the experience gained from our comparative tour d'horizon suggests a
measure of caution.
It is easy to see that by lifting restrictions on the admission
of hearsay, courts produce a stronger "liberating" effect in Anglo-American justice than in continental procedure. In the latter, the absence of admissibility rules does not mean that the
use of hearsay becomes a matter relegated to judicial discretion.
As shown, judges in the "unitary" tribunal must give grounds
for their reliance on derivative proof, and the prospect of review by superior courts injects some restraint in their decision
making. The appellate review of these grounds also permits
higher courts to establish a degree of predictability in the treatment of secondary informational sources. In common law systems, on the other hand, the removal of admissibility rules
could usher in unstructured judicial discretion in the treatment
of derivative proof. Because jury verdicts are difficult to attack
for insufficient evidentiary support, the abolition of all limitations on the use of hearsay may be a risky proposition.
Furthermore, a powerful factor supporting the increased
96. Some difficulties remain because, in a system of trial preparation controlled by the parties, mutual exchange of information cannot be complete.
Compelled cooperation and a competitive factfinding style create zones of tension. See MIRJAN DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 5766, 131-32 (1986).
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sensitivity to second-hand information, a factor that was present in the formative period of hearsay doctrines, still operates
in Anglo-American administration of justice: the parties (their
lawyers) continue to gather evidence and present it at trial.
The resulting competitive style of processing evidence requires
restrictions on the use of derivative information, both for reasons of fairness to the opponent of evidence, and as an inducement for the parties to seek and employ the best means of
proof available. So long as this competitive style of proof-taking prevails, attempts to modify hearsay doctrines should not
neglect considerations of "adversarial fairness" and the realities
of lawyer-driven factfinding. This is especially true in those
Anglo-American jurisdictions where the professional ethos of
trial lawyers is weak. Even continental countries, where judicial control over factfinding reduces the strength of fairness arguments, nevertheless provide incentives for factfinders to rely
on original sources of information-at least in criminal cases.
These mild strictures against derivative proof in continental
courts are not controversial. To the extent that reforms are
contemplated on the Continent, they seem to be in the direction of erecting more serious obstacles to the free use of secondhand information. Subtle parallels of experience thus indicate
that great caution should be exercised in using derivative
means of proof for purposes of adjudication.

